Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting by Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We would like to thank law audiences at Columbia, Virginia, Northwestern, Berkeley, Chicago, Yale
and ALEA 2007, business/finance audiences at Columbia, Haas, Fuqua, and Oxford. Special thanks
to Jesse Fried, Henry Hansmann, Avery Katz, Ed Morrison, Eric Posner, and Eric Talley for helpful
discussions and feedback. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Kenneth Ayotte  and Patrick Bolton. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting
Kenneth Ayotte  and Patrick Bolton




In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following
recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual
rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights, that are also enforeceable
against third parties outside the contract. Our analysis starts with the following question: which contractual
agreements should the law allow parties to enforce as property rights? Our proposed answer to this
question is shaped by the overall objective of minimizing due diligence (reading) costs and investment
distortions that follow from the inability of third-party lenders to costlessly observe pre-existing rights
in a borrower's property. Borrowers cannot reduce these costs without the law's help, due to an inability
to commit to protecting third-parties from redistribution.  We find that the law should take a more
restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties when these rights are i) more costly for
third-parties to discover, ii) more likely to redistribute value from third-parties, and iii) less likely to
increase efficiency.  We find that these qualitative principles are often reflected in observed legal rules,
including the enforceability of negative covenants; fraudulent conveyance; corporate veil-piercing;
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The economics of contracting literature and legal scholarship conceive of property rights in
very diﬀerent ways. Economists, starting with the seminal contribution of Coase (1960), em-
phasize the role of property rights as a starting point for contracting. While the traditional
statement of the “Coase theorem” stresses the irrelevance of the allocation of property rights
for economic eﬃciency, later contributions by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976) on the one hand argue that property rights can aﬀect incentives, due to the
status of the property owner as a residual claimant, and Williamson (1979) and Klein, Craw-
ford and Alchian (1978) on the other argue that property rights provide protection against
ex-post opportunism. Subsequently, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
have deﬁned property rights instead as residual rights of control, and have shown that al-
locations of property rights can be valuable in alleviating holdup problems when contracts
are incomplete. These formal analyses of property rights have been used to explain ﬁrm
boundaries, capital structure, and authority relationships within organizations.
Although there may be diﬀerences in their conceptions of property rights, economists
usually start from the perspective that property rights are optimal allocations of rights
within a contracting coalition. This perspective, and its implication for the role of the legal
system, is important. When all aﬀected parties start around a common bargaining table, as
is often assumed in economic models, there is no role for a legal system beyond enforcing the
contractual agreements reached by the parties. Left to their own devices, rational parties will
be expected to allocate all relevant rights contractually, in a way that maximizes total social
surplus.1 As a result, the economist’s framework to date has little to oﬀer in the way of a
positive analysis that explains features of property and contract law, nor does this framework
oﬀer normative prescriptions for the design of these laws, other than the recommendation
that voluntary agreements should always be strictly enforced.
The economist’s conception of property rights stands in sharp contrast to the concept
1Economists’ viewpoint often presupposes that the law is also necessary to defend an initial allocation of
ownership rights to assets (however they may be determined), but this is not entirely obvious. Even if the
law is completely silent on this issue and all assets are in the “public domain” at the outset, if all parties
are available to bargain over the uses of assets going forward, eﬃciency is achievable. This implies that
legal intervention in the realm of property rights (over and above enforcing contracts) is necessary only when
third-parties outside the initial contracting coalition are aﬀected.
2of property as deﬁned in recent legal scholarship (Merrill and Smith 2000, 2001a, 2001b,
Hansmann and Kraakman 2002). This literature distinguishes property rights from ordinary
contractual rights by deﬁning property rights as rights in rem (rights to assets that are good
against third-parties), while contractual rights are rights in personam (good only against the
contracting parties themselves). In other words, property rights are unique because they bind
not only the parties to a contract, but also bind third-parties who lie outside a contracting
coalition. In this paper, we create the ﬁrst formal model to explore the consequences of this
deﬁnition of a property right. Speciﬁcally, our deﬁnition of a property right follows the one
used by Hansmann and Kraakman (2002):
“Property rights diﬀer from contract rights in that a property right in an asset,
unlike a contract right, can be enforced against subsequent transferees of other
rights in the asset.”
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h i sd e ﬁnition of property rights is that the law can play a more
active role in increasing the eﬃciency of contractual agreements when third-parties outside
a contracting coalition become relevant.2 When information about pre-existing rights is
costly to acquire, these third-parties may be unknowingly aﬀected by the rights of others.
As a result, the law, as these authors argue, might optimally standardize the property rights
that can be created to limit externalities to unrelated parties (Merrill and Smith 2000), and
it may also set limits on the notice required to make property rights enforceable (Hansmann
and Kraakman 2002).
With this in rem feature of property in mind, we formally analyze the design of property
laws in a ﬁnancial contracting setting. We start with a ﬁrm run by an agent (call the
agent A) that requires funding from two lenders, who each provide valuable capital to an
investment project, but each lender contracts with the ﬁrm at a diﬀe r e n tp o i n ti nt i m e .A sa
result, the lenders may have competing claims to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows, and knowledge of the
rights of pre-existing loan contracts may be imperfect.3 The ﬁnancial contracting context
2We should note that there are alternative deﬁnitions of what constitutes a “property right” in legal
scholarship. For example, some deﬁne a property right as a right that is enforced through a “property rule”
such as speciﬁc performance, while a contractual right is a right that is enforced through monetary damages.
(Calabresi and Melamed 1972; Ayres and Talley 1995; Kaplow and Shavell 1995) This deﬁnition gives rise
to diﬀerent legal design problems than the one we consider here, however.
3Our model assumes a sharp diﬀerence regarding the information about the contracts of other parties,
3is a particularly important environment in which to consider these issues, because of the
possibility that insolvency can result in incomplete satisfaction of a lender’s claim. Thus, a
mere in personam right to sue a bankrupt debtor can be substantially less valuable than an
in rem right (such as priority rights to seize and sell collateral) that also binds past and/or
future creditors. When the law allows for the borrower to give an early lender (call this
lender P1) stronger property-like protections, it can alleviate credit constraints by protecting
P1 against borrower moral hazard and the claims of a later lender (call this lender P2). On
the other hand, P2 might act more conservatively in extending funds when he is uncertain
about the pre-existing rights of P1. He might insist on being compensated for due diligence
expenses to verify these pre-existing rights, and if he can not be suﬃciently reassured, might
forgo lending entirely.
Our model generates several ﬁndings. First, in a world without reading costs, there
can be aﬃrmative reasons for the law to allow A to grant P1 not only seniority over P2
(say, through a ﬁrst-priority security interest in the ﬁnal cash ﬂow), but also an additional
property right, known in law as a restraint on alienability. This right prevents A from legally
transferring some of his remaining cash ﬂow rights to a new lender. This right is valuable
in a world in which monitoring A’s behavior is costly for P1,a n dA has the incentive to
over-borrow from P2 to continue his project ineﬃciently at P1’s expense. Intuitively, to
ensure that his claim is repaid, P1 may require not only seniority, but also that A retain
suﬃcient cash ﬂow rights so that his incentives to make the project succeed are preserved.
Given this aﬃrmative justiﬁcation for restraints on alienability (protecting earlier lenders
from dilutive contracts by subsequent lenders), one might wonder why the law often limits
the enforceability of these rights in practice. Our model suggests an answer when P2 must
expend reading costs to observe and fully understand the pre-existing rights of P1.I f P1
and A anticipate that P2 will not conduct any costly due diligence to discover P1’s rights,
this would open the door for P1 to write a redistributive contract with A that diverts as
much value from P2 as the law will enforce. With this possibility in mind, P2 will insist
that A reimburses him for suﬃcient due diligence costs, enough so that P1 and A will not be
tempted to redistribute. In equilibrium, ineﬃcient deadweight reading costs are incurred,
which is costly to acquire, and the observability of one’s own contract, which is assumed to be costlessly
understood by the parties themselves. Thus, our model leaves room for legal intervention into property
rights, but not into contractual rights. Nevertheless, the assumption of limited observability has been made
in the contractual context; see Katz (1990).
4and when these costs are suﬃciently large, credit rationing to A may occur.
Importantly, all of these deadweight reading costs are borne by A in equilibrium, but A
cannot eliminate them, because he cannot (in a costless, observable way) credibly demon-
strate to P2 that he has not written a redistributive contract with P1.T h i s l o g i c d i ﬀers
from Merrill and Smith (2000), who argue that legal restrictions on property rights are valu-
able because they limit externalities across ﬁrms (i.e. an A-P1-P2 coalition increase due
diligence costs for other A-P1-P2 coalitions by creating a novel property right).4 In our
model, restrictions can be valuable because they reduce externalities within a ﬁrm (i.e. A
and P1 impose due diligence costs on P2,w h i c hA pays for in equilibrium, but can not
reduce without the credible commitment provided by the law).
Our model results in three qualitative principles that govern optimal enforcement of
property rights. We ﬁnd that the law should take a more restrictive approach to enforcing
a right (given by A to P1) against a third party (P2) when the right (i) is more costly for
P2 to discover; (ii) is more redistributive from an uninformed third-party, and (iii) is less
likely to increase the eﬃciency of contractual relationships. We analyze a series of examples
in ﬁnancial contracting settings, and ﬁnd that these principles are often reﬂected in existing
law. The principles echo central themes in Hansmann and Kraakman (2002), who argue that
an optimally designed law balances the value of a right to its users against the incremental
veriﬁcation costs borne by non-users. Our model shows that when redistributive rights are
enforceable, these veriﬁcation costs are most severe. Hence, an optimal law restricts the
enforceability of these rights in particular.5
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will introduce the general model
4Merrill and Smith use the phrase “zone of privity” to include all parties that are relevant to a particular
transaction, which would include P1, P2 and A in our setup. Unlike Merrill and Smith, who argue that
all costs inside the zone of privity are internalized, we ﬁnd that because of reading costs and the threat
of opportunism, P1 and A can not internalize the costs to P2, giving rise to a role for the law even if
externalities outside the zone of privity are not important.
5Our analysis is also related to the large literature on optimal priority and the eﬃciency of secured
credit. Bebchuk and Fried (1996, 1997) argue for mandatory limits on the priority of secured creditors
in bankruptcy; unlike our model, their argument relies heavily on the existence of involuntary creditors or
small creditors who ﬁnd it costly to adjust interest rates. Schwartz (1991) argues that current law regarding
creditor priorities should be replaced by a pure ﬁrst-in-time rule, which is similar to the Coasean legal
environment we consider here. Schwartz’s model allows for costs of revealing information to creditors, but
does not consider the role the law might play in reducing them.
5and Section 3 solves for optimal contracts in a world where all information about pre-existing
contracts is costlessly observable by third-parties. Section 4 solves the model in the presence
of reading costs by third-parties, which leads to our key results regarding the optimal legal
design of property rights and generates comparative statics that can be applied to existing
features of the law. Section 5 discusses some of these features and how they relate to the
principles in our model, and Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
We consider a simple model of a ﬁrm with a single project that requires two rounds of
ﬁnancing from two diﬀerent lenders. At date 1, a wealthless agent (A) is endowed with a
valuable idea, and must raise an amount of i1 from a principal (P1) to start the project.
To continue the project at date 2, the agent requires an additional cash input of i2 from a
second principal (P2). To focus on the interface between principal P1’s and P2’s claims,
we shall make the restrictive assumption that P2 c a nc o n t r i b u t en om o r et h a nt h er e q u i r e d
investment outlay i2 and that P1 can not contribute the entire amount i1 + i2
6.A l s o ,b o t h
principals operate in competitive lending markets, all parties are assumed to be risk-neutral,
and there is no discounting.
2.1 Technological assumptions
If the project receives two rounds of ﬁnancing (i.e. it is continued at date 2 rather than
liquidated) it produces a random cash ﬂow at date 3. If the project does not receive the
required funding at date 2, it is liquidated for a known value L>0.T h e ﬁnal cash ﬂow
outcome depends on the realization of the state of nature at date 2, which becomes observable
to P2 and A at date 2 before the continuation decision is made. We allow for two states of
6There may be several reasons why each principal is only willing to invest a limited amount. For one,
the lenders may be wealth constrained, or they may prefer to have a limited exposure in a ﬁrm for risk-
diversiﬁcation reasons. Finally, principal P1 may be reluctant to invest more than i1 f o rf e a rt h a tt h ea g e n tA
simply wastes the surplus funds. It is possible to extend our model to allow for an endogenous determination
of each principal’s investment and to show that under some quite intuitive conditions each principal would
not want to invest more than the required amount ij. However, for the sake of simplicity and brevity we
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nature, ˆ s ∈ {sg,s b}. The good state of nature, sg, occurs with probability π and the bad
state, sb, with probability 1 − π.
In the bad state of nature the project yields a cash-ﬂow of X at date 3 with probability
p a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y(1 − p) the project yields no cash ﬂow but a liquidation value γL,
where γ<1. In the good state of nature the cash-ﬂow outcome of the project depends on
the agent’s eﬀort choice e ∈ {0,1} at date 2. If the agent chooses e =1then the project
yields a ﬁnal cash ﬂow X with certainty. If the agent chooses e =0 , the project yields the
same cash-ﬂow as in the bad state of nature. The agent’s private cost of choosing high eﬀort
(e =1 )i sc>0,a n dt h ec o s to fe =0is normalized to zero.
We summarize the date 2 timeline and the project’s expected payoﬀsi nF i g u r e1 .
2.2 Contracting assumptions
The agent A and principal P1 can write a bilateral long-term debt contract at date 1.
Similarly, the agent and principal P2 can write a bilateral debt contract at date 2.E a c h
bilateral contract speciﬁes the amount the principal agrees to lend ij and a repayment Fj at
date 3. The contract between P1 and A can also specify a maximum amount Φ1 of date 3
cash ﬂows A is allowed to pledge to P2, and whether the claim F1 is senior, on par, or junior
to F2.
7Importantly, our assumptions rule out the possibility that contract terms may be contin-
gent on the state of nature sl, l = g,b. We justify this restriction on the usual grounds that
the state of nature sl, while observable to A and P2 at date 2, is not veriﬁable in court.7 We
also rule out the possibility for now that P1 is available to monitor the ﬁrm, or to renegotiate
his contract with A at date 2 after the realization of the state of nature sl.T h u s , P1 is a
passive lender who can only lend at date 1 and collect at the ﬁnal date. This assumption is
admittedly strong, but is made to demonstrate in the simplest possible fashion the potential
conﬂicts between P1 and P2 when they lend at diﬀerent points in time.8
The four key economic issues in our contracting problem are as follows. First, the agent’s
repayment obligations Fj must be low enough that the agent has an incentive to put in high
eﬀort (e =1 )i ns t a t esg. Second, F1 must be suﬃciently low to make room for continuation
ﬁnancing by P2 at date 2, whenever continuation is eﬃcient. Third, P1 also faces a threat of
dilution of the value of his claim F1 at date 2, when the agent issues a new claim F2 to P2.I t
is, of course, possible for P1 to limit this dilution risk by issuing a senior claim F1. However,
as we show below, issuing a senior claim is not a suﬃcient protection against dilution in our
setup. To obtain full protection P1 must also specify a limit Φ1 on date 3 cash ﬂows the
agent is allowed to pledge to P2. Fourth, and most importantly for our analysis, the very
protections against the risk of dilution that P1 speciﬁe si nh i sc o n t r a c tm a y ,i nt u r n ,c r e a t e
ar i s ko fl o s sf o rP2. This latter risk arises from the fact that P1’s contract with A may
contain covenants that limit P2’s claims on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows, and the due diligence that
P2 must expend to discover these covenants in the ﬁne print of P1’s contract is costly and
imperfect. We discuss the formal representation of the due diligence technology in Section
4.
7The non-veriﬁability of the state is not at all crucial to the results, but it simpliﬁes the set of contracts
that can be written.
8The assumption that P1 is not available at all at date two implies among other things that P1 cannot
accelerate his loan in response to an attempt by P2 to collude with A against P1. While repayment
accelerations do sometimes occur in practice, they require that P1 monitor A carefully, which is costly.
Moreover a surprise acceleration of a loan might also hurt P2.
83 Optimal Contracting in a world with no information
costs
Economic models of contracting with multiple principals, similar to the one outlined above,
are cast in a world where, i) there are no information costs; ii) there is freedom of contracting;
iii) property rights are exogenously given; and, iv) contracts are perfectly enforced by courts9.
What precise form property rights take in these models is typically not spelled out explicitly.
It is helpful, therefore, to begin our discussion in this section by teasing out explicitly the
underlying assumption on property rights in these models. We then proceed with an analysis
of optimal contracts when there are no information costs.
3.1 Legal rules: The Coasean environment
In this section we attempt to spell out the benchmark legal environment that has become
standard in the economics literature. We refer to this environment as the Coasean legal
environment. It has, in our view, the following three main components:
a) Well-deﬁned, fully-alienable, and fully-divisible property rights
In our common agency setup, A’s initial endowment is his idea (and his human
capital), and the principals P1 and P2 are endowed with their cash stocks. The assumption
on property rights is that these individuals begin at date one with full ownership rights to
these assets and that these will be perfectly enforced by a court. Full ownership rights are
deﬁned as a bundle of property rights similar to the notions of usus, fructus,a n dabusus
under Roman law:
Thus, the full owner of an asset has all of the following property rights:
a) the exclusive right to use the asset (usus),
b) the exclusive right to receive income from the asset (fructus),
c) the exclusive right to modify or transform the asset (abusus).
Furthermore, we also single out among abusus rights,
d) the exclusive right to transfer any subset of these rights by contract (alienability).
Thus, in the Coasean legal environment, full ownership is a starting point, and the bundle
of property rights that comprise ownership can be freely divided.
9See Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986), Segal (1999) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)
9b) Freedom of Contracting: Courts will enforce all contracts regarding transfers of
property rights (based on information they can verify), with no restriction on the space of
allowable contracts, other than that the property right being transferred must be under the
initial ownership of one of the contracting parties. Note that this deﬁnition allows for parties
to write enforceable contracts that place restraints on alienability. In the present context,
for example, if A has the right to the cash ﬂows from an asset X,s h em a yr e t a i nt h er i g h t
to spend the cash, but she could also transfer to P1 the right to sell these cash ﬂows to a
third-party or to pledge them as collateral for a debt contract.
c) First-in-time (FT) rule: in the Coasean legal environment, when any inconsistency
arises between contracts, the ﬁrst contract written will have priority.
We should emphasize the extreme nature of the FT rule in the Coasean legal environment,
which diﬀers from most real-world laws of property and contract. To give a concrete example
that will be relevant to our model, suppose A writes the following sequence of contracts with
P1 and P2:
C1 : P1 will lend 45 dollars to A and is entitled to the ﬁrst 50 dollars of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnal
cash ﬂow. Any subsequent claim on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow by any third-party is null and void.
C2 : P2 will lend 25 dollars to A and is entitled to 30 dollars of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnal cash ﬂow.
Now suppose that the ﬁnal cash ﬂow is 100. In the Coasean legal environment, P1 would
receive 50, A would receive 50, and P2 would receive zero. In contract C1, A transferred
away his right to pledge future cash ﬂows to subsequent lenders. Thus, the FT rule would
require that P2’s claim be voided; he would have no right to recover anything from A,e v e n
though A had knowledge of his inability to pledge cash ﬂow to P2,a n dh er e c e i v e sap a y o u t
that would allow him to pay P2 in full.
3.2 Optimal Contracting with no reading costs
We shall restrict ourselves to a subset of parameter values for which the optimal contract
for P1 and A,a n df o rP2 and A, is such that continuation with high eﬀort is optimal in the
good state and liquidation at date 2 is optimal in the bad state.
For ease of exposition, we will use the notation Rg to denote the maximum pledgeable
income to P1 in the good state, conditional on continuation with eﬀort:




10To see that this is the maximum pledgeable income to P1,n o t et h a ti no r d e rt oe n c o u r a g e
A to choose high eﬀort, A requires a suﬃcient stake wg in the output when the project
succeeds. An optimal contract will pay the agent wg when the cash ﬂow is X and 0 if
output is 0.T h u s , i n o r d e r t o e l i c i t e ﬀort from A, the following incentive compatibility
constraint must be satisﬁed:






Therefore, the maximum pledgeable income to all lenders is X − c
1−p.S i n c e P2 will not
participate unless he receives an expected payment equal to his monetary contribution, P2
must be repaid i2. Thus the maximum pledgeable income to P1 is as in (1).
With this notation, the parameter restrictions we maintain throughout the paper are:
Assumptions:
A1)
X − c − i2 >L
The ﬁrst assumption tells us that in the good state, continuation with high eﬀort is
economically eﬃcient relative to liquidation.
A2)
pX +( 1− p)γL− i2 <L
Assumption A2 says that continuation with low eﬀort is ineﬃcient relative to liquidation;
hence liquidating the project will be optimal in the bad state at date 2. Assumptions A1
and A2 together imply also that high eﬀort is eﬃcient relative to low eﬀort in the good state.
A3)
πRg +( 1− π)L ≥ i1
Assumption A3 implies that the ﬁrst-best action plan, which involves continuation in
the good state with eﬀort and liquidation in the bad state, can generate enough cash ﬂow
to repay P1 for his loan. Since we assume that L<i 1, A3 also implies that Rg >L ; i.e.
11continuation with eﬀo r tp r o d u c e sm o r ep l e d g e a b l ei n c o m et oP1 than liquidation in the good
state.
Finally, we shall also assume that:
A4)




As we will show in the next section, assumption A4 implies that P1 may be at risk of
dilution of his claim in the bad state if he writes a debt contract with A where Φ1 = X.
This assumption is central to our analysis, since it implies that P1 will not be fully protected
against the risk of dilution by seniority alone.
3.2.1 First-best outcome
Suppose a benevolent, social welfare-maximizing planner could observe the state of the world
and make all investment and eﬀort decisions. Under the assumptions above (A1-A4), the
social planner would choose to fund the project, to continue the project in the good state at
date 2 while at the same time choosing high eﬀort (e =1 ), and to liquidate the project at
date 2 in the bad state. This ﬁrst-best action plan would maximize social welfare, which is
given by
π(X − c − i2)+( 1− π)L − i1
3.2.2 Implementation: state-contingent contracts
If the contracting parties can write (bilateral) state-contingent contracts, then this ﬁrst-best
action plan can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the following
contracting game.
At date 1, the agent makes the following take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a state-contingent
debt contract to P1.A g e n tA borrows i1 from P1 and in exchange agrees to:
1. liquidate the project and to pay the entire liquidation proceeds L to P1 at date 2 in
the bad state, and
2. to repay P1 a face value of debt
F1 =
i1 − (1 − π)L
π
12at date 3 in the good state, and ﬁnally
3. to make F1 senior to any subsequent claims on the ﬁrm.
Given that this contract covers P1’s investment i1 in expected terms, P1’s (weak) best
response is to accept this contract.
It is easy to see that the best response to this contract for A i nt h eg o o ds t a t ea td a t e2
is to oﬀer P2 the following contract: A borrows i2 dollars from P2 in exchange for a junior
debt claim with face value F2 = i2.A g a i n ,a st h i sc o n t r a c tc o v e r sP2’s investment i2, P2’s
(weak) best response is to accept this contract.
Finally, to see that A’s contract oﬀer at date 1 is a best response to the respective
equilibrium moves of P1 at date 1,a n dA and P2 at date 2, observe that under this contract
A gets the ﬁrst-best expected payoﬀ π(X−c−i2)+(1−π)L−i1 which is equal to total social
welfare under the ﬁrst-best action plan. This is the highest expected payoﬀ A could achieve
in any equilibrium, since any deviation from the ﬁrst-best action plan at date 2, induced
by another contract oﬀer, would be anticipated by P1 and priced into the loan contract
through a higher F1 (i.e. a higher interest rate). In other words, A’s private objective is
perfectly aligned with social welfare in a Coasean legal environment, and therefore A’s choice
of contract implements the ﬁrst-best social outcome.
3.2.3 Incomplete contracts: the insuﬃciency of seniority
While a ﬁrst-best outcome is straightforward to implement under complete contracting, it
is less obvious under incomplete contracting (when courts cannot observe the state of the
world). At ﬁrst glance, one might expect that a simple senior debt contract alone would be
suﬃcient to generate the socially eﬃcient outcome even with non-contingent debt contracts.10
Indeed, if P1 has a senior debt claim one might expect that this would generate the
right social incentives for P2 to refuse to lend in the bad state, since he bears more of the
cost of failure than P111. Even so, under assumption A4, this is not the case. Since under
assumption A4 we have X>R g + i2
p , it is still in the joint interest of P2 and A to continue
the ﬁrm ineﬃciently at the expense of P1, and thus to dilute the value of P1’s debt claim.
10The idea that junior debt can be used to dilute senior claims in the presence of moral hazard was
originally formalized in Bizer and DeMarzo (1992).
11Since P1’s loan is senior, he will recover the entire cash ﬂow in the low state if the project fails, γL while
P2 will receive nothing. Thus, the consequences of failure are more severe for P2 than for P1.
13Indeed, P2 is then willing to lend i2 and take a junior debt claim with face value F2 = i2
p
and A would then receive an expected payoﬀ from continuation of




which is strictly higher than what A gets in liquidation.12
Thus, under the parameter assumptions in the model, seniority alone is not suﬃcient
to protect P1. Though social welfare is destroyed by the ineﬃcient continuation, the value
transferred from P1 to the P2/A coalition outweighs this loss when A4 holds. Thus, the
incentives of P2 and A are not aligned with social welfare when a simple senior debt contract
is written. Since A b e a r st h i se ﬃciency loss in equilibrium, A would prefer to give P1
stronger rights than seniority alone in order to achieve eﬃciency and maximize his private
payoﬀ. Giving an additional property right to P1 to specify a limit Φ1 of date 3 cash ﬂows
A is allowed to pledge to P2 achieves this goal.
3.2.4 The value of restraints on alienability
In the good state P2 is willing to lend i2 in exchange for debt with face value F2 = i2, since
the project will succeed with certainty.13 In the bad state, however, the project fails with
12It is possible to correct this ineﬃciency by giving A a payment in the event of liquidation, of say φL,
suﬃcient to oﬀset the positive gain A would get under continuation. Deviations from absolute priority in
bankruptcy could, thus, be rationalized in our model as a way of forestalling ineﬃcient continuation.
In a somewhat richer model, however, one might be concerned that by structuring the agent’s incentives
in this way one might undermine her incentives to perform at date 1. For example, if eﬃciency requires that
A raise the probability of reaching the good state from λ to π>λat date 1,b yt a k i n ga c t i o na =1with
private eﬀort-cost ψ, rather than the free action a =0 , then rewarding the agent in the event of liquidation
might be counterproductive.
Indeed, the agent’s incentive constraint at date 1:
π(X − F1 − F2) − ψ ≥ λ(X − F1 − F2)
without any payment in liquidation might be satisﬁed, while the constraint with a payment φL in liquidation
:
π(X − F1 − F2)+( 1− π)φL − ψ ≥ λ(X − F1 − F2)+( 1− λ)φL
might not.
13By deﬁnition of Rg,a sl o n ga sP1 is promised no more than this amount, P2 can be promised i2 if the
good state occurs, and A will prefer high eﬀort. Therefore, the probability of success will be 1 and P2 will
14probability 1 − p if it is continued. As we have pointed out above, P2 will then require a
face value of debt higher than i2 (F2 must be at least i2
p ) in order to be compensated for this
added default risk. Thus, the following contract will result in a ﬁrst-best outcome:
Proposition 1 Under assumptions A1 to A4, an optimal contract between P1 and A is
such that A takes a loan i1 in return for a date 3 senior (collateralized) debt repayment of
F1 =
i1 − (1 − π)L
π
,
and a commitment not to pledge more than Φ1 = i2 to P2 at date 3.
The best response for P2 and A at date 2, then is to sign a new loan contract only in the
good state specifying a loan of i2 in return for a (riskless) junior claim of i2 at date 3.
Proof. see appendix
In order to implement the ﬁrst-best, P1 requires not only seniority, but also that A make
a credible commitment not to pledge new cash-ﬂow in excess of i2. This commitment can be
achieved by transferring to P1 (or abandoning altogether) the right to pledge the project’s
cash ﬂows to future lenders over and above i2.T h u s ,Φ1 is a form of negative covenant,w h i c h
would apply to all future debts in excess of i2, whether these are secured or unsecured. Since
P2 understands that A can legally pledge no more than i2, he is not willing to lend in the
bad state, and the ﬁrst-best is achievable.14We will refer to the optimal contract between P1
and A in Proposition 1 as the eﬃcient contract, and denote this contract C
fb
1 .
It is important to note the eﬃciency gains that come from granting a property right in
A0s assets to P1 that binds P2, instead of a mere contractual right that binds only A.T o s e e
this, suppose that if A breaches its contract with P1 (by promising P2 junior debt with face
value greater than i2), P1 has only a contractual right to sue A for breach of its contract,
but can not invalidate P2’s debt. In this environment, the ﬁrst-best outcome would not
obtain.15 This would follow because, at date 2, A would convey to P2 a property right in
be repaid with certainty.
14If P2 can take a claim on A’s personal assets (his dividend from the ﬁrm at the end of date three) then
he would be equally happy to lend into an ineﬃcient continuation in the bad state. Thus P1’s right to
restrict alienability must extend beyond the corporate form and also to A’s assets more generally in order
to eﬀectively shut down P2’s loan.
15A similar point is made by Schwartz (1996), arguing for property-like protections for unsecured creditors
with negative covenants because contractual remedies may be insuﬃcient.
15the project’s cash ﬂows that binds P1.W h e n P1 wins his breach of contract suit against
A, the property available to satisfy the judgment would be only the property A has left to
transfer, which would be the cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm after paying P2.16 Anticipating this
outcome, P2 will be willing to lend in the bad state, and the ineﬃcient continuation will not
be prevented.17
4 Equilibrium Contracting with Reading Costs
We have shown that in our model there are eﬃciency gains to be had by allowing ﬁrms to
create restraints on their ability to alienate cash ﬂo wr i g h t s .M o r e o v e r ,i naw o r l dw i t hn o
transactions costs and perfectly observable contracts, there are only beneﬁts and no costs
to these restraints. The limits on alienability merely allow the ﬁrm to commit to protecting
early lenders against the ex-post risk of dilution at the hands of subsequent lenders. Thus,
in a perfect world with fully observable contracts there are aﬃrmative reasons to allow for
such divisions of property rights to be enforceable. In this section, we introduce contract
reading costs and show that limits on alienability also create costs for third parties. When
alienability of assets can be restricted in any way contracting parties desire, it becomes more
diﬃcult and costly for third parties to determine which assets are alienable and under what
contingencies. The reading costs third parties face are a form of negative externality that
the contracting parties impose on others. What is more, the contracting parties are not well
placed, as we shall show, to internalize these externalities.
4.1 The contracting game with reading costs
We begin this subsection with a description of the contracting game between A, P1,a n d
P2. Before negotiations between P2 and A start, P2 is unable to observe the contract C1
16This argument assumes that P1 w o u l dh a v en or i g h t st os u eP2 as well (say, for tortious interference
with contract). If this were possible, the ﬁrst-best could be achieved by this means. According to our
deﬁnition, P1’s right to prevent additional debt would be considered a property right, since P1 has a right
that binds a third-party rather than a right which is only good against A.
17Of course, P1 could take A0s remaining cash ﬂow right, making him indiﬀerent between continuation
and liquidation. Adding a small private beneﬁt to continuation for A would make the property right strictly
more valuable than the contractual right only.
16between P1 and A without incurring reading costs. Thus, when negotiations begin, P2 can
only form a prior belief over what type of contract P1 and A have signed at date 1.A s
in standard signaling games, P2 can, however, rationally revise his beliefs about the initial
contract between P1 and A when he sees A’s contract oﬀer C2 and conducts due diligence.
We assume that the contracting game at date 2 then proceeds as follows:
1. Agent A begins by making a loan contract oﬀer C2 = {i2,F 2,ρ} to P2,w h i c hc o n t a i n s
the terms of the second loan, F2 (as well as its priority status in repayment at date 3)
and also a commitment by agent A to reimburse ρ dollars of P2’s due diligence costs.18
2. P2 proceeds with the due diligence speciﬁed in A’s contract oﬀer19. Due diligence
r e s u l t si na no b s e r v e dc o n t r a c tΩ(C1).
3. Nature decides whether P2’s due diligence is eﬀective, which occurs with probability
P(ρ)=
ρ
ρ+κ, or ineﬀective, which occurs with the complementary probability (1 −
ρ
ρ+κ).I f e ﬀective, P2 will observe (and understand) the true contract P1 and A have
written. (Ω(C1)=C1). If ineﬀective,P2 observes the eﬃcient contract (Ω(C1)=C
fb
1 ),
regardless of the contract P1 and A have actually written. The second lender P2
knows P(ρ) but not nature’s decision.
4. Finally, after completing the due diligence P2 decides whether or not to lend given his
updated beliefs about C1.
This simple setup is intended to capture the possibility that P1 and A may have written
terms into their contract that have the eﬀect of redistributing date 3 cash-ﬂows to them rather
than P2. The second lender’s uncertainty can come from two possible sources. First, he
may be unsure that he observes the entirety of the pre-existing loan contracts that A has
written. For example, he may be wary that A did not disclose a hidden obligation, such as
a loan guarantee to a parent company, that would reduce the assets available to P2 in the
event of default. Second, even if P2 is conﬁdent that he possesses all relevant pre-existing
contracts, some of the covenants in these contracts may be overlooked, or have implications
18For simplicity, we assume that due diligen c ec o s t sc a nb ep a i di n - k i n d ;t h a ti s ,A can commit to P1 that
these costs will be spent on due diligence (as opposed to being divertable by P2).
19We assume that when indiﬀerent P2 always conducts the due diligence. Thus, P2 always conducts a
level of due diligence that A fully reimburses.
17for P2’s rights that are misleading. The parameter κ>0 then represents the diﬃculty of
discovering the meaning or implications of a clause: as κ approaches zero, even low levels
of due diligence will discover hidden terms with probability approaching one; as κ grows
toward inﬁnity, a given due diligence expenditure discovers hidden terms with probability
approaching zero.
Although P2 may not always discover a hidden term, he understands that when P1’s
contract appears normal to him, he still “may have missed something”, and makes his lending
decision given this risk. Lender P2 is aware, however, that the more due diligence that P1
and A willingly reimburse, the less likely is the possibility that P1 and A may have included
a redistributive clause in C1, since discovery of the clause by P2 would preclude further
lending and result in an ineﬃcient liquidation. Thus, due diligence gives P2 conﬁdence to
lend, even if it never results in complete certainty about P1’s contract.
4.2 Equilibrium Contracting and Due Diligence
We begin our analysis by pointing out that there does not exist a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the game with reading costs, which implements the ﬁrst-best outcome without any due
diligence by P2. To see this point, suppose that P2 simply follows the same lending policy
as before without reading the details of the contract between P1 and A and hoping that P1
and A would have written the eﬃcient contract. Could the eﬃcient contract between P1
and A still be an equilibrium move in a world with reading costs? If so, then the presence
of reading costs for third parties would not be a serious concern for welfare, as agents would
simply continue to draft contracts as if they were in a transactions-cost free world and they
would not have to worry about imposing negative externalities on others.
However, as intuition suggests and as the next lemma establishes, when P1 and A expect
P2 not to do any due diligence and to follow the eﬃcient lending policy irrespective of
what form their own contract takes, then their best response is to write a contract that
involves maximal redistribution from P2 to themselves (call this contract Cx
1). Adding
some additional notation, let Vx denote the joint continuation payoﬀ to P1 and A in the
event that they write this maximally redistributive contract and P2 lends20.T h e n w e h a v e
20The maximally redistributive contract C1 would set Φ1 =0 ,s ot h a tP1 and A would be able to claim
t h ee n t i r ec a s h - ﬂow net of eﬀort costs: (X − c).
In principle, the law could even allow for negative Φ1, implying that P1 could seize P2’s property (over
18the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Suppose that P2 always accepts the contract C2 = {i2,i 2,0} in the good state
without incurring any due diligence costs. Then the best response for P1 and A is to write
a maximally redistributive contract Cx
1 that takes the following form:
Principal P1 agrees to lend i1 dollars to A in exchange for a senior debt claim with
face value F1 =
i1−(1−π)L
π and a covenant that fully restricts alienability of future cash-ﬂows
(Φ1 =0 ). In the Coasean legal environment, P1 and A would receive the maximum possible
joint continuation payoﬀ Vx = X − c.
This lemma implies that in a Coasean legal environment in which third parties incur
contract reading costs, it will be impossible to avoid these costs completely, because this
would increase the likelihood of opportunism by P1 and A.
We now proceed to describe what we will term the least-cost separating equilibrium of the
contracting game. This will be the equilibrium with the lowest feasible (deadweight) due
diligence costs that supports lending by P1 and P2 in equilibrium. As is well known, the set
of possible Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcomes in a signaling game is typically large and our
game is no exception. This multiplicity is driven by the general form the conditional belief
function can take and the weak restrictions imposed by the equilibrium consistency-of-beliefs
requirement in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. However, in our game as in other signaling games
a particular belief function appears to be particularly reasonable intuitively.
We assume that the belief function is such that P2 will attach positive probability weight
to at most two contracts: the eﬃcient contract C
fb
1 , and the maximally redistributive contract
Cx
1.L e t ν(C1) ∈ [0,1] denote P2’s belief that C
fb
1 was written. As in standard signaling
games, P2 can rationally revise his beliefs about C1 to ν2(C1 | C2,Ω(C1)) when he sees A’s
contract oﬀer C2 and the observed contract Ω(C1) that results from his investigation. We
assume this belief function takes the general form that any contract oﬀer C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ}
—w h e r eρ is below a cutoﬀ value ρ∗— is interpreted by P2 as signaling the redistributive
contract Cx
1.I n t h a t c a s e P2’s updated beliefs are ν2(C1 | C2,Ω(C1)) = 0 and P2’s best
response is to reject such a contract. On the other hand, all contract oﬀers C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ},
with ρ ≥ ρ∗ provide suﬃcient reassurance to P2 that he is willing to investigate, and he will
lend as long as Ω(C1)=C
fb
1 .
and above i2)i fP2 makes a loan. In a world with no reading costs, there would be no loss in enforcing
these extremely redistributive contracts, because P2 would never sign them.
19We now characterize the cutoﬀ ρ∗ that implements the least-cost separating equilibrium.
Consider some ρ ≥ ρ∗,s ot h a tP2 will lend after observing C
fb
1 .I n t u i t i v e l y , P1 and A will
ﬁnd one of two possible strategies optimal given P2’s beliefs.
One strategy is to write contract C
fb
1 , which is optimal for P1 and A given a fully-
informed P2.I fP1 and A were to agree on this contract, followed by the same contract oﬀer
C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ}, their joint continuation payoﬀ in the good state would be
X − i2 − c
The other strategy is to write the maximally redistributive contract Cx
1,h o p i n gt h a tP2
will not discover it. This contract would return the highest possible joint payoﬀ Vx = X −c
to the parties if the investigation is ineﬀective, but will result in liquidation if P2’s due













With these expressions in hand, the following inequality tells us for what level of due
diligence costs P1 and A will prefer to write the eﬃcient contract, given P2’s beliefs:












Since equilibrium requires that P2’s beliefs must be consistent with the behavior of P1
and A along the equilibrium path, the lowest feasible cut-oﬀ ρ∗ is given by the solution ρ for
which (2) holds as an equality:
ρ
∗ =
κ{Vx − (X − i2 − c)}
X − i2 − c − L
(3)
In the Coasean legal environment (in which the law allows fully-ﬂexible design of property




X − i2 − c − L
(4)
In the least-cost separating equilibrium, P1 and A must set aside ρ∗ up-front to compen-
sate P2 for his due diligence: if they oﬀer less, P2 will rationally believe that the contract
is redistributive and refuse to lend.
20The ﬁnal step in implementing this equilibrium is to verify that, inclusive of these due
diligence costs, P1 and A prefer to implement an equilibrium that involves P1 lending at
date 1, and continuing with eﬀort in the good state by borrowing from P2.T h i s r e q u i r e s a
slightly modiﬁed assumption to reﬂect the presence of positive reading costs:
A3b: π(Rg − ρ∗)+( 1− π)L ≥ i1
Under this assumption the project can feasibly repay P1 inclusive of P2’s due diligence
costs, which are paid only in the good state.
With these assumptions in hand, we summarize this subsection by describing fully the
least-cost separating equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions above (A1, A2, A3b, A4), the least cost separating
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the lending game with reading costs is as follows. At date 1, P1
and A agree on contract C
fb
1 taking the following form:
1. P1 lends i1 + ρ∗ to A.I nt u r n ,A invests i1 in the project and holds ρ∗ until date 2;
2. P1 obtains a senior debt claim of F1 =
i1+ρ∗−(1−π)(L+ρ∗)
π ,a n dac o m m i t m e n tn o tt o
pledge more than Φ1 = i2 to P2.
At date 2, in the good state:
1. A oﬀers contract C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ ∗} to P2,
2. P2 conducts due diligence, accepts the contract after observing Ω(C1)=C
fb
1 ,and invests
i2 in the ﬁrm;
3. A chooses high eﬀort (e =1 ) and the project yields X at date 3.
At date 2 in the bad state: P2 refuses to lend and the project is liquidated, paying L+ρ∗
to P1.
Proof. See the appendix.
In this equilibrium, since we have assumed (by assumption A3b) that ρ∗ is not too large,
the only ineﬃciency caused by the presence of reading costs for P2 are the deadweight costs
of due-diligence ρ∗.
21It is important to note, however, that the direct costs of due diligence are not the only
economically relevant costs to imperfect observability. When assumption A3b is relaxed, so
that
π(Rg − ρ
∗)+( 1− π)L<i 1 ≤ πRg +( 1− π)L,
then P1 does not expect to be repaid his initial contribution, and refuses to lend. As a
result, due diligence costs cause credit-rationing: ﬁrms that would otherwise receive funding
under costless observability can not obtain an initial loan from P1.
Whether the deadweight costs are the reading costs actually expended, or the indirect
costs of underinvestment in valuable projects, it is clear that these losses will be higher when
ρ∗ is higher. A casual examination of (3), then, gives the following comparative statics:
Corollary 4 Relative to the ﬁrst-best world with no reading costs, the social welfare loss in
a world with positive reading costs is greater when:
1. Due diligence expenditures are less eﬀective (higher κ);
2. The net gains from redistribution to P1 and A (Vx − (X − i2 − c)) are larger;
3. The net present value of P2’s loan (X − i2 − c − L)i ss m a l l e r .
Proof. These follow immediately from the deﬁnition of ρ∗.
These comparative statics are intuitive. The less eﬀective is due diligence in ﬁnding a
hidden term, the more cost must be expended to eliminate the redistribution threat. When
the net gains from redistribution (Vx − (X − i2 − c)) are large relative to the cost of being
caught (X − i2 − c − L), P2 must be able to catch a redistributive covenant with greater
probability for P1 and A to prefer to write an eﬃcient contract rather than a maximally
redistributive one.
4.2.1 Optimal Property Rights with Omniscient Courts
Up to this point, we have assumed a legal environment (which we termed the Coasean legal
environment), in which the law allows contracting parties maximum ﬂexibility in designing
property rights that the law will enforce. In the setting with costless observability, the
ﬁrst-best action plan is possible in the Coasean environment, implying that no alternative
legal rule can be preferred.
22In a world with reading costs, however, the Coasean legal environment is not a welfare-
maximizing legal rule. To see this, suppose a social planner can observe and condition legal
rules on the same set of variables that the parties can contract upon. Then an optimal legal
rule would limit the rights that A could grant to P1, to eliminate the risk of expropriation.
With this risk eliminated, P2 will be free to lend without requiring due diligence.
Lemma 5 In a world with perfect, omniscient courts, an optimal legal rule modiﬁes the
Coasean legal environment by adding the following limitations on the space of enforceable
rights:
1. A limit on A’s indebtedness: A can promise P1 a face value of no more than
F1 =
i1 − (1 − π)L
π
.
2. A rule against excessive restraints on alienability: A and P1 can set Φ no less than i2.
In this modiﬁed legal environment, the ﬁrst-best action plan can be implemented by the
sequence of contracts in Proposition 1 with no reading costs expended by P2.
Proof. Omitted.
The lemma demonstrates, at least in principle, that legal rules limiting the set of en-
forceable property rights can increase social welfare. Nevertheless, the obvious critique of
the above intervention is that it would require an unrealistic level of knowledge by courts
to implement successfully in practice. Given that ﬁrms vary along many dimensions that
are unobservable, the optimal cap on F1 and Φ will be ﬁrm-speciﬁc and diﬃcult to identify
precisely on a case-by-case basis. As a result, legal rules that limit the space of enforceable
property rights in practice will be subject to a trade-oﬀ: stricter restrictions may reduce
due diligence and credit rationing costs, but due to their imperfect design, tighter restric-
tions will impose costs on parties who would write these contracts even in a world of perfect
observability.
4.2.2 Optimal Property Rights under Imperfect Legal Enforcement
To see this trade-oﬀ in our formal model, consider the following imperfect legal rule: at
date 2, A may promise P2 up to i2 dollars that is senior to P1.I f A writes this contract
with P2, it will be enforced notwithstanding the terms of the contract between A and P1.
23This modiﬁed legal environment is similar in spirit to some legal rules that give later lenders
non-waivable priority over earlier lenders, such as the priority given to debtor-in-possession
lenders in bankruptcy.21
To compare welfare (which is also A’s expected payoﬀ) under these two legal envi-
ronments, note that total expected welfare in the least-cost separating equilibrium in the
Coasean legal environment (assuming that P1’s participation constraint is satisﬁed) is given
by
π(X − c − ρ
∗)+( 1− π)L − i1 − i2 (5)
While investment eﬃciency is guaranteed in the Coasean legal environment (continuation
with eﬀort in the good state, and liquidation in the bad state), the deadweight due diligence
costs ρ∗ are incurred in equilibrium. Social welfare under the modiﬁed legal environment
that “rules in” the new loan is the following:
π(X − c)+( 1− π)(pX +( 1− p)γL) − i1 − i2 (6)
If P2 knows for sure that he will recover at least the value of his loan, he would be willing
to lend at fair terms to A at date 2 without the need for any due diligence. But as we have
s e e n ,t h ec o s to fp r o v i d i n gP2 with a certain return is that P2 and A have the incentive to
invest and continue in the bad state of the world. Comparing social welfare in (5) and (6),
we observe that as long as
πρ
∗ > (1 − π)(L − pX − (1 − p)γL)
the “rule-in” legal environment will be social welfare-improving relative to the Coasean
environment.
The comparative statics underlying the inequality are intuitive. When ρ∗ increases (which
will be higher when κ and Vx are higher all else equal), the more restrictive legal environment
improves welfare relative to the Coasean environment. On the other hand, L−pX−(1−p)γL
represents the forgone eﬃciency gains when the bad state occurs. As these eﬃciency gains
rise, the Coasean environment is more likely to be preferred. Finally, the probability (1−π)
can be thought of as a measure of the likelihood that the potentially unenforceable right
21See Bisin and Rampini (2006), who argue that a reorienting of creditor priorities in bankruptcy can be
valuable for moral hazard reasons in a world where exclusivity is not enforceable. See Triantis (1993) for a
discussion of debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing in bankruptcy.
24would be used in equilibrium. When the states of the world in which the right is valuable
are suﬃciently unlikely, the more restrictive environment is more likely to be preferred.
It is worth emphasizing that this result is driven by the inability—in a world that allows
complete contractual freedom—of P1 and A to commit to protecting P2. If the inequality
above holds, P1 and A w o u l dl i k et oc o m m i tt oo ﬀering P2 a senior claim, because of the
due diligence cost savings, even though this would result in an ineﬃcient continuation in the
bad state. But although they prefer this outcome, they can not achieve it in the Coasean
environment. Any attempt to oﬀer this “guaranteed seniority” to P2 would not be credible
u n l e s sa c c o m p a n i e db ya no ﬀer to reimburse ρ∗ in due diligence costs. Lender P2 is aware
that, due to the ﬁrst-in-time rule in the Coasean world, P1’s contract could contain a term
setting Φ =0 , which would essentially nullify P2’s contract. Thus, P2 will react with
suspicion to any proposal that does not include reimbursement of due diligence, and refuse
to participate.
In a world where legal design and courts are imperfect, there is a diﬃcult trade-oﬀ to
resolve in the design of property laws in a ﬁnancial contracting setting. While we can
not resolve these trade-oﬀs quantitatively, the analysis in this section suggests three general
principles that are relevant for resolving this trade-oﬀ:
Principle 1 The law should be less likely to enforce a right if it is more costly for third-parties to
discover (higher κ)
Principle 2 The law should be less likely to enforce a right if it is more redistributive from third
parties (Vx)
Principle 3 The law should be more likely to enforce a right if the expected eﬃciency gains are
larger ((1 − π)(L − pX − (1 − p)γL))
These principles are summarized graphically in Figure 2:
5L e g a l R u l e s a n d O p t i m a l P r o p e r t y R i g h t s
With these principles in mind, we now discuss some examples of legal rules regarding property
rights. Our goal is to demonstrate that in a variety of situations, the general principles in
our model regarding optimal legal design are often reﬂe c t e di nt h ew a yp r o p e r t yr i g h t sa r e
enforced in practice.
25Optimal Property Rights: General Principles
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Which property rights should the law allow P1 and A to enforce against P2?
Figure 2:
5.0.3 Principle 1: Discovery costs
Perfected and unperfected security interests Our model predicts that the law will
employ a more restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties, all else equal,
when these rights are more costly for a third party to discover. U.S. law regarding secured
credit provides an illustration of this principle. Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), a secured creditor can acquire important rights that bind third-parties if the
claim is perfected.22 For example, a perfected security interest will follow the collateral if
the debtor sells it to a third-party. Also, if the debtor pledges the same collateral to a
subsequent lender, the ﬁrst creditor will have priority over the second.
Under the UCC, obtaining perfection requires that the creditor give the world notice of
the security interest, usually by recording it in a ﬁling system that third-parties can check.23
22Note here that our deﬁnition of a property right is diﬀerent from the deﬁnition that is sometimes used
in this context. For example, a lender whose security interest has attached but not perfected is often
said to have a property right, though the secured creditor has rights only against the debtor, not against
third-parties.
23There are some exceptions to this general rule. In some cases, a security interest can be perfected
by acquiring possession of the collateral, which also serves a notice function to third-parties. There are
also some cases in which neither notice ﬁling nor possession is required. Under revised Article 9, sales of
“payment intangibles” are automatically perfected and thus do not require notice ﬁling. Schwarcz (2006)
26If the secured creditor fails to record, the security interest is said to have attached but not
perfected. In this scenario, the law allows the secured lender to enforce contractual rights
that are good against the borrower, such as the ability to declare default and accelerate the
loan, but the law will not enforce property rights that bind third-party buyers or lenders
against the asset.
The notice-ﬁling system guarantees that a security interest (or the absence thereof) can
be veriﬁed easily, which reduces the required investigation costs of third-parties.24 Without
such a system, the later lender (P2) must rely on the cooperation of the debtor (A)t om a k e
knowledge of the early lender’s (P1) prior interests available at low cost. For the reasons
we have discussed in the model, the debtor may have the incentive to make this information
costly to discover. Hence, the law applies a restrictive approach to enforcing property rights
when the interest is not recorded.
Perfected security interests and negative pledge covenants The legal restriction
on the property rights of an unperfected secured creditor also applies to unsecured creditors
with negative covenants in their contracts. For example, many bond indentures contain
“negative pledge” clauses that are intended to prevent the borrower from granting security
to a future lender. Other negative covenants limit the amount of total debt that a borrower
can incur in the future.
Our model demonstrates that enforcement of these covenants as property rights can be
valuable in preventing overinvestment, but the law may refuse to enforce them. In practice,
courts usually deny property-like remedies to unsecured creditors with negative pledge clauses
when these clauses are violated.2526 The exceptions to this general rule have occurred when
the court veriﬁes that the subsequent lender had actual knowledge of the negative covenant
and violated it willingly. In such situations, courts have created remedies for the negative
argues that this poses a problem for securitization of such assets, as potential buyers of these intangibles can
not be certain about their priority status with respect to potential competing interests.
24In addition to mere recording, the standardization of the security interest also likely reduces investigation
costs. We discuss standardization in an earlier version of this paper (Ayotte and Bolton 2007)
25The oldest known case on this subject is Knott v. Shepherdstown Manufacturing, 5 S.E. 266 (W. Va.
1888) in which the court denied an equitable lien to an unsecured creditor with a negative pledge clause,
arguing that the breach of the negative covenant gave rise only to a claim for damages.
26Similarly, an unsecured creditor can not subordinate future unsecured creditors unless they explicitly
agree to the subordination (Schwartz 1989)
27pledge holders that bind the subsequent lender.27
The usual rationale given for the diﬀerence between the perfected security interest and
the negative pledge is the absence of a registration system for negative pledges that reduce
veriﬁcation costs (Bjerre 1999). Like an unrecorded security interest, discovery of a negative
pledge requires the cooperation of the borrower, which is less reliable than a recording
system.
Enforcing the negative pledge against P2 when he has actual knowledge is also consistent
with our model. If the court can verify that P2 was aware and understood the negative
covenant, then there is no cost to enforcing P1’s rights exactly as he intends. Importantly,
however, the law generally does not place the burden on P2 to discover negative covenants,
which helps limit P2’s required veriﬁcation costs.28
5.0.4 Principle 2: Redistributive rights
Fraudulent conveyance Our model suggests that the law adds value by refusing to en-
force a division of rights that is particularly redistributive from third-parties. The law
of fraudulent conveyance is intended to invalidate exactly these redistributive transfers of
rights. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), an unsecured creditor can
avoid (invalidate) a transaction if it satisﬁes the conditions for actual fraud or constructive
fraud. Actual fraud requires demonstrating fraudulent intent on the part of the parties to the
transaction (in this context, A and P1) to redistribute from P2. The tests for constructive
fraud require the creditor to demonstrate that the transaction left the ﬁrm in poor ﬁnancial
condition, so that it is insuﬃciently capitalized, or unlikely to be able to pay future debts
when they come due.29 It is exactly these transactions that are likely to be redistributive
27In the case First Wyoming Bank v. Mudge (748 P.2d 713 Wyo. 1988) the court found that a secured
lender who knowingly violated a negative pledge clause was held liable for tortious interference with contract
(the negative pledge holder was able to obtain damages from the later secured lender).
28This does not fully resolve the issue from a normative standpoint, of course. Bjerre (1999) argues
that Article 9 should be expanded to allow registration of negative pledge clauses (prohibitions on future
secured debt), thus allowing them to bind third-parties. Pursuing this logic further, the law could allow any
negative covenant to be publicized, including stronger covenants (such as the ones we model here through
the Φ parameter) that void any subsequent debt, secured or otherwise. In a prior version of this paper
(Ayotte and Bolton 2007) we discuss this issue in more detail.
29Constructive fraud can be established if the creditor can show that the debtor ﬁrm a) received less than
reasonably equivalent value for the transfer, and b) that the debtor was in a precarious ﬁnancial situation
28from P2.
Fraudulent conveyance attacks often arise in leveraged buyouts that subsequently fail.
To make the example concrete, suppose P1 and A engage in a leveraged recapitalization,
whereby P1 lends money to a corporation controlled by A in exchange for a large debt claim
secured by A’s assets. The corporation pays A the proceeds from the debt issue as a dividend,
leaving A’s ﬁrm highly levered. If the corporation later borrows from P2, and then ﬁles for
bankruptcy, P2 may be able to attack the recapitalization as a fraudulent conveyance, and
avoid the transfer of property rights (the security interest) given to P1.
Notably, consistent with Principle 1, some courts have refused to apply fraudulent con-
veyance law to protect future creditors in situations where the cost of becoming informed
about past transactions is suﬃciently low. In the case Kupetz v. Wolf, the court refused to
protect creditors who invested after a well-publicized leveraged buyout:
“Because fraudulent conveyance statutes were designed to protect creditors
from secret transactions by debtors, the same rules should not apply when the
transaction is made public. Future creditors may not complain when they knew
or could easily have found out about the transaction. This certainly appears to
be the case in this particular LBO. The transaction was well-publicized and the
Trustee has not claimed or presented evidence that any of the future creditors
were not aware of Wolf & Vine’s ﬁnancial dealings.” (emphasis added)30
The proper role for fraudulent conveyance law is a topic that has received substantial
attention in existing legal scholarship. Baird and Jackson (1985) argue that creditors can
use protective covenants to prevent fraudulent conveyances (such as a leveraged buyout that
dilutes earlier unsecured creditors) voluntarily if they so choose, but under current law, ﬁrms
can not “contract out” of fraudulent conveyance protection if courts apply it erroneously or
over-broadly. We agree with this point in principle, depending on how the opt-out is
achieved. Our model does not justify any mandatory restrictions on P1’s ability to limit
his own rights that are good against P2 (or vice versa).31
at the time of the transfer (Blum, 2004).
30845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988)
31Moreover, in such a context, A would have every incentive to reveal this contractual term to P2,a si t
would result in more generous lending terms from P2. This is not true in the opposite case (where A and
P1 restrict P2’s rights), as A has the incentive to disguise this information.
29This suggests that an optimal fraudulent conveyance law could be a default rule that
allows creditors to opt-out of the protection in their own loan contract.32 However, our
model can be used to explain why the law might refuse to enforce a contract between A and
P1 that prevents P2’s right to seek the fraudulent conveyance remedy, as this would require
P2’s investigation to discover a right that may be harmful to him. In this context, our
model implies that there is a valid trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of reducing due diligence
expenditures and credit-rationing, and the costs of ineﬀective or incorrect enforcement of
this standard by courts.
Piercing the corporate veil Though we have focused on seniority of claims within a ﬁrm
as a means of protecting P1’s claims against dilution by P2, another means of protecting
P1 is through the creation of separate legal entities. For example, A might create a parent
company and a wholly-owned subsidiary, and allow P1 to lend at the parent level, while P2
lends at the subsidiary level. This would imply that P2 would be senior to P1 with respect
to assets held at the subsidiary level, but P2 would have no ability to reach the assets at
the parent level if the subsidiary’s assets are not suﬃcient to repay P2.
When such multi-tiered organizational structures exist, P2’s information about which
entity owns which assets, and the nature of the relationship between the two entities, is
obviously important. As we have seen, A might have an incentive, for example, to disguise
t h ef a c tt h a tP2 is lending to an under-capitalized subsidiary rather than a well-capitalized
parent company. When such misrepresentation is possible due to vague boundaries between
entities, creditors can attempt to pierce the veil of the subsidiary and pursue the parent’s
assets to satisfy their claim.33 While the application of veil-piercing by courts is diﬃcult to
generalize, Thompson (1991) ﬁnds that the most common reasoning includes undercapital-
ization of the subsidiary and the misrepresentation of entity boundaries by the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrst rationale is consistent with Principle 2: the more thinly-capitalized the subsidiary, the
32This is true, of course, subject to the risk that a creditor may fail to observe or understand a term in
his own contract, as in Katz (1990).
33Veil-piercing is an equitable doctrine that is determined on a case-by-case basis, but most commentators
summarize that it is a remedy to be applied only in cases of fraud or approaching fraud: “the separate
personality of the corporation will be disregarded or the corporate veil pierced whenever the separateness of
the corporate form is employed to evade an existing obligation, circumvent a statute, perpetuate a fraud or
crime or generally commit an injustice or gain an unfair advantage.”
30lower the recovery for the later lender if veil-piercing is not allowed.34 The second rationale
is consistent with Principle 1, that in misrepresenting the boundary of the entity, the ﬁrm
made discovery costs prohibitively large.
5.0.5 Principle 3: Eﬃciency
Limitations on anti-assignment clauses Our model suggests a trade-oﬀ in legal design
between limiting veriﬁcation costs, and allowing for divisions of rights that enhance eﬃciency.
One example of balancing these competing forces can be found in the treatment of contractual
anti-assignment clauses. For instance, a ﬁrm operating as a franchisee (A) may desire to
grant a security interest in his franchisee rights to a lender (P2) as a means of obtaining
cheaper credit, but the franchisor (P1)m a yv a l u et h er i g h tt or e s t r i c tw h oc a nb e c o m ea
franchisee. In a diﬀerent context, a bank (A) might wish to sell its rights to payment on a
loan to an investor (P2), but the borrower (P1) may be concerned about who his creditors
are in the future.
These applications are a slight departure from the model in that the principals are not
both lenders, but the underlying trade-oﬀ is similar. If the law allows complete contractual
freedom between P1 and A to limit A’s ability to assign his rights to P2, this could result
in redistribution from an uninformed P2 who attempts to acquire A’s rights, and later ﬁnds
himself empty-handed. The possibility of this outcome would increase the required due
diligence of potential P2’s before agreeing with A, and potentially limit the liquidity of
these ﬁnancial contracts in secondary markets if P2 attempts to resell them.35 On the
other hand, limiting the scope of P1 and A to create such restraints might hinder eﬃcient
contracting. For example, after making a loan to a borrower, a relationship bank might
be tempted to assign a loan to a lender who would be unwilling to forgive minor covenant
violations, simply because this “tough” lender is willing to buy the loan at a high price.36
34Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) argues, in the same spirit as our model, that allowing for veil-piercing
in these contexts can be understood as a means of providing incentives for ﬁrms to disclose their undercapi-
talization to creditors when a full investigation of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnances is prohibitively costly.
35Some anecdotal evidence from Canada supports this feature of our model. In Quebec and Ontario,
anti-assignment provisions are not part of the commercial code. As a result, Fingerhut (2006), in an article
targeted at practicing lawyers, warns that “additional due diligence is called for when the collateral includes
Quebec or Ontario receivables.”
36Consistent with this logic, Guner (2007) ﬁnds that borrowers extract concessions from banks that are
31Allowing these restraints on assignment to be enforceable helps the bank commit to the
relationship with the borrower.
Revised Article 9 resolves this tension in a way that balances the key trade-oﬀso fe ﬃ-
ciency gains against veriﬁcation costs. In contracts that fall under §9-408 the UCC inval-
idates agreements between A and P1 that attempt to restrict assignability to P2.37 This
restriction allows potential third-parties to lend against or purchase these assets without
taking the steps to verify that these anti-assignment clauses are not present. To protect
P1, however, the law allows a contractual anti-assignment provision to limit P2’s rights to
enforce the security interest against P1. Thus, a borrower in a commercial lending context
can ensure that he will not be subject to the aggressive collection tactics of an unknown loan
buyer if he contracts for this protection, yet the loan buyer can be certain that in purchasing
rights to payment, his potential losses from failing to discover an anti-assignment clause are
limited.38
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we adopt a deﬁnition of property rights that departs from most of the eco-
nomics literature on the subject and follows a deﬁnition of property rights in recent legal
scholarship. Because this deﬁnition emphasizes that property rights are rights that bind
third-parties, a key concern is that third-parties may be imperfectly informed about the
pre-existing rights that aﬀect them. In a ﬁnancial contracting context, these concepts are
particularly important because borrowers may become insolvent. As a result, lenders are
particularly worried about the presence of rights that bind other lenders with competing
claims.
We develop a formal theoretical model in which lenders and borrowers are rational, in that
likely to sell loans through lower interest rates.
37Paragraph §9-408 includes, among other things, “general intangibles” such as franchise and licensing
agreements, and sales of “payment intangibles” such as commercial loans. For a thorough discussion of
these issues, see Morse (2001), Plank (2001) and Schwarcz (1999).
38The reader might wonder what the value of a security interest in the intangible to P2 w o u l db ei nt h e
presence of an anti-assignment clause if P2 can not enforce his rights against P1.I f P2 were a secured
lender to A against the intangible, the protection P2 would obtain in this case is, among other things, the
right to adequate protection payments if A ﬁles for bankruptcy. For an example, see Plank (2001), p. 331.
32they anticipate the strategic behavior of other players, and can write sophisticated contracts
that attempt to mitigate ineﬃcient, opportunistic behavior. The model demonstrates that,
in a world with costless and complete information, a legal environment that allows parties
maximum ﬂexibility to create and enforce any allocation of divided property rights is optimal.
When observability is costly, however, there can be a role for the legal system to limit the
space of property rights that are enforceable.
In a world with full enforceability, third-parties will not participate without conducting
suﬃcient due diligence to reassure themselves that redistribution at their expense has not
occurred. In equilibrium, these deadweight costs of due diligence are borne by the borrowing
ﬁrms. Importantly, though, this does not rule out a role for optimal design of property laws.
In our model, there is no way for ﬁrms to reduce these costs, due to an inability to commit
to protecting third-parties from redistribution. The law can add value by providing ﬁrms
with a credible mechanism to make this commitment. If the cost of discovering a right is
large enough, and the right is potentially redistributive, then the law will optimally refuse
to enforce such a right. The law in our model can be seen as mandatory, in that the law
will mandate a relationship between the enforceability of a right and the cost of discovering
that right by third-parties which can not be adjusted by contract. On the other hand, if
contracting parties can demonstrate to a court that they made third-parties aware of their
pre-existing rights, then our model suggests the rights should be enforced.
In our investigation into existing law, we ﬁnd several examplest h a tb r o a d l yc o n ﬁrm the
qualitative trade-oﬀsi nt h em o d e l . L a w st h a tg o v e r nﬁnancial contracting in which third-
parties are aﬀected often limit the ability of early lenders to create enforceable property
rights that can be redistributive. The law is less likely to enforce a property right when it
is unlikely that the right has an eﬃciency rationale, and is more likely to enforce the right
when knowledge about the right is relatively inexpensive for a third-party to acquire.
While our formal model is intended to add an additional element of realism to the study of
legal design in a ﬁnancial contracting setting, there are other important factors our analysis
does not address that are important. For instance, many of the mandatory standards in the
law that are intended to protect third-parties also entail substantial ex-post litigation costs.
In a world with costly courts that make judgment errors, later lenders could threaten to use
the legal protections we document above in an opportunistic way as a means of extracting
value from earlier lenders. This could lead to deadweight costs and ineﬃcient allocations
33as a result, tipping the scales toward a more permissive legal environment. On the other
hand, the ability of the early lender to protect himself by monitoring the ﬁrm’s contracting
with the later lender is not present in the current model. Adding the possibility of costly
monitoring would imply that P1 has other means of protecting himself from dilution by P2,
reducing the cost of less-permissive legal rules.
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7 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
36Proof. Note ﬁrst that under the contract written between P1 and A, P2 is not willing to
lend to A at date 2 in the bad state. By lending i2 principal P2 gets an expected repayment
which is less than the loan i2. Indeed, the most P2 can hope to get is
pi2 +( 1− p)max{0,γL− F1} = pi2
since
γL− F1 = γL−
i1 − (1 − π)L
π
=






Next, P2 is willing to lend to A at date 2 in the good state under the contract written





− i2) − (1 − π)L ≥ i1
by assumption A3. And when X − (i2 + F1) > c
1−p, A’s best response is to choose high
eﬀort (e =1 ), since then:
X − (i2 + F1) − c>p (X − (i2 + F1)) (7)
as




by assumption A3,a n db yd e ﬁnition of Rg,




The RHS of (7) is A’s expected payoﬀ under the low eﬀort choice (e =0 ), since when the
project fails and only yields a liquidation value γL the ﬁrm’s total liabilities (i2+F1) exceed
its assets γL,s ot h a tA gets zero.
Proof. When A chooses high eﬀort the ﬁrm gets a cash ﬂow of X f o rs u r ea td a t e3.T h e
ﬁrm’s debt is therefore safe, so that P1 is willing to lend i1 in return for a debt repayment
of the same amount at date 3.
377.0.6 The Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Proposition 3
An equilibrium of our game is taken to be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium,w h e r e :
1. All agents play a best response given their beliefs, and
2. All players’ updated beliefs are consistent with all agents’ best responses.
More concretely,
a P1 and A choose C1 at date 1 given P2’s expected equilibrium best response,
b A chooses the contract oﬀer C2 optimally at date 2 given the past choice of C1 at date
1 and given P2’s beliefs ν2(C1 | C2,Ω(C1)),
c P2 best responds by deciding whether or not to lend when Ω(C1) is observed. (We
assume that P2 conducts any due diligence that is reimbursed by A irrespective of his
beliefs).
d P2’s beliefs ν2(C1 | C2,Ω(C1)) are consistent with the equilibrium choices, C1 and C2.
Under these assumptions, and under the belief-function ν2(C
fb
1 | C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ},Ω(C1)=
C
fb
1 )=1for ρ ≥ ρ∗ and ν2(C
fb
1 | C2,Ω(C1)) = 0 otherwise, the least-cost separating Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of the full contracting game is stated in Proposition 3. The proof of
Proposition 3 is as follows:
Proof. Given that under due diligence ρ∗ we have











(X − c), (8)
it is a (weak) best response for P1 and A to agree to contract C
fb
1 .G i v e nt h ec h o i c eo fC
fb
1 ,
P20s investigation will produce Ω(C1)=C
fb
1 . Thus, P2’s equilibrium beliefs ν2(C
fb
1 | C2 =
{i2,i 2,ρ ∗},Ω(C1)=C
fb
1 )=1are consistent with P1 and A’s equilibrium play. It is a (weak)
best response for A to oﬀer contract C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ ∗} at date 2, and a (weak) best response
for P2 to accept C2 in the good state, but to reject it in the bad state. In particular, A
cannot obtain a higher payoﬀ by oﬀering any other contract C2 = {i2,i 2,ρ},w i t hρ 6= ρ∗
at date 2. Indeed, any contract with ρ>ρ ∗ would involve unnecessarily high due diligence
expenditures, and any contract such that ρ<ρ ∗ w o u l db er e j e c t e db yP2 given his updated
beliefs, yielding a payoﬀ of L + ρ∗ to P1 and A. T os h o wt h i si sl e s st h a nX − i2 − c, note
that by A3b, π(Rg −ρ∗)+(1−π)L ≥ i1. Combining this assumption with L<i 1,a n dt h e
deﬁnition of Rg, it follows that X − i2 − c>R g >L+ ρ∗.
38